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Abstract—Flexibility is an important property for general
access control system and especially in the Internet of Things
(IoT), which can be achieved by access or authority delegation.
Delegation mechanisms in access control that have been studied
until now have been intended mainly for a system that has no
resource constraint, such as a web-based system, which is not
very suitable for a highly pervasive system such as IoT. To
this end, this paper presents an access delegation method with
security considerations based on Capability-based Context Aware
Access Control (CCAAC) model intended for federated machine-
to-machine communication or IoT networks. The main idea of
our proposed model is that the access delegation is realized by
means of a capability propagation mechanism, and incorporating
the context information as well as secure capability propagation
under federated IoT environments. By using the identity-based
capability-based access control approach as well as contextual
information and secure federated IoT, this proposed model
provides scalability and flexibility as well as secure authority
delegation for highly distributed system.
Index Terms—capability-based access control, delegation, se-
curity, IoT
I. INTRODUCTION
Security and privacy are the two key elements in providing
trust and allowing successful operation of IoT. One way to
enable security and privacy is to implement access control,
which covers both authentication and authorization. On the
other hand, IoT is characterized by highly dynamic nodes
connectivity and network topologies due to the ever-changing
nature of wireless channel, mobility, and factors such as
limited power that might cause a node to die out. To this
end, a dynamic and flexible design of access control system
that is suitable for IoT is of the most importance.
First of all, in order to cope with the restriction in such a
system like IoT, a lightweight access control model needs to be
introduced. For this purpose, we introduce a secure Capability
based Context Aware Access Control (CCAAC) model that
is suitable for highly pervasive and ubiquitous system such
as IoT. The main idea of the model lies in the principle
of identity-based capability access control where capability
becomes the central point on access control mechanism and
an identifier that is used to increase the scalability and control
the capability propagation [1]. Moreover, the model is com-
bined with context awareness to accommodate dynamic access
policy enforcement.
Secondly, in order to achieve dynamic and flexible access
control system, various models of delegation of authority
techniques in access control have been proposed. Some of
those proposed methods addressed the delegation issue within
federated identity management environment [2], [3], and also
challenges in cross-domain delegation by specifically using
capability- based access control [4], [5]. However, those
delegation methods are designed mainly to serve web-based
services which involve a large IT infrastructure. Those kinds of
delegation models are not practically visible for an IoT system,
which has a lot constraint in its resource, e.g. memory and
power. Hence, we propose a delegation of authority method
based on dynamic capability propagation suited for pervasive
system such asIoT.
In the identity-based capability, the subject’s identifier is
included in the capability, which makes it able to authenticate
itself upon its effort to gain access or authorization of a certain
object. Moreover, it is important to mention that the delegation
of authority by means of capability propagation is part of
CCAAC overall design model. Therefore, delegation method
in CCAAC is not an extension of any existing access control
model, e.g. Role Based Access Control (RBAC), as presented
in most of the previous works. The contributions of the paper
include: providing a federated IoT model as a baseline for the
entire proposed delegation model, and further defining the del-
egation model along with a protocol description and security
considerations which incorporate identity-based capability and
contextual information.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Related works
in this area is presented in section II. A brief introduction and
definition of the CCAAC model are presented in section IV.
Section V explains the access delegation mechanism based
on our proposed CCAAC model along with some security
considerations. Finally, conclusion and future works are given
in section VI.
II. RELATED WORKS
Research on delegation of authority using capability has
been investigated in [4] and [5]. [4] addressed the issue of
role and/or permission delegation based on a RBAC model
in a cross-domain environment using capabilities. The central
idea behind their proposed mechanisms was the mapping of
capabilities into roles and permissions in each domain. [5]
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extends [4] by adding the delegation of task to be performed
in the model for workflow systems.
Some works focusing on dynamic and flexible delega-
tion methods in distributed and multiple security domains
have been reported in [2] and [3]. [2] focused on dynamic
authorization delegation in federated environment between
entities or machine-to-machine delegation. Furthermore, it
investigated chain of delegation in multiple entities and how
to provide secure delegation framework. [3], on the other
hand, focused more on the user-to-user delegation and did
not consider multiple entities delegation. Its main contribution
was a delegation framework in federated environment using
an access token, regardless of the access control model being
used. Furthermore, [3] explains the mechanism of issuing a
token, asserting it into an authorization document, and service
provisioning based on the delegate token.
On the other side of the table, federated IoT networking
has not been much discussed in the literature. However,
[6] has defined a complete set of networking, management,
and security framework for device-to-device or machine-to-
machine communication in the context of a Personal Network
(PN). Federated IoT environments based on the PN concept
[6] will be further elaborated in the next section.
III. FEDERATED-IOT
Identity ”Federation” is a pretty popular term within the
web security world and refers to management of a web user’s
identity across different security domains. The main reason of
enabling federation in the web environment is that the work
flow of the system often requires a user that is authenticated
in one domain to be authenticated in other domains as well.
However, a concrete definition of the Federated IoT which is
conceptually different as compared to the web security world,
needs to be determined before addressing the issue of authority
delegation in such environment.
First of all, the identity in the web-based system refers to
a person’s identity while in IoT, identity refers to a device
or ”thing”. Therefore, the interaction of identities in IoT is in
the form of device-to-device communication. Some research
direction on device-to-device federated network along with its
security framework has been done in the context of PN [6].
Although PN [6] did not address IoT directly, its networking
concept, especially the federated network, is very relevant to
our purpose. Moreover, its security framework could provide
a foundation for this work to further extend it to our access
control model along with the model of authorization delega-
tion.
An example of federated IoT network based on the concept
of PN-Federation is depicted in Fig. 1. Three IoT network
domains are considered, i.e. private user, retail shop, and
goods producer network, and two IoT-Federated networks are
considered. One IoT network domain consists of one or more
IoT cluster and the inter-cluster communication can be done
either through the internet infrastructure as shown in Fig. 1 or
through a wireless ad-hoc connection. Device-to-device com-
munication within a cluster, i.e. intra-cluster communication,
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Fig. 1. An example of Federated IoT network with delegation scenario
can be carried out by using different wireless access technol-
ogy, e.g. Radio Frequency Identification (RFID), IPv6 over
Low-power Wireless Personal Area Network (6LoWPAN),
ZigBee, bluetooth, wifi, etc.
IV. CCAAC MODEL
This section describes the basic concept as well as defini-
tions of CCAAC model. This consists of a system architecture
for supporting CCAAC, a proposed capability structure, and
some important definitions in the CCAAC model.
A. System architecture for supporting CCAAC
The system architecture for supporting the CCAAC model
is depicted in Fig. 2. This system architecture is adapted from
Context Aware Security Manager (CASM), which is part of
PN’s security framework introduced in [6]. It is important to
note that the PN has been referred in this work due to its ad-
vance networking concept for device-to-device communication
that opens a path as one candidate of network implementation
in IoT. Correspondingly, the security framework brought up
within the PN would be a good starting point in designing
a security framework in IoT, considering their similarities in
characteristics and requirements.
Security Decision Point
Policies
Profiles
Access 
List
Fig. 2. System architecture for supporting CCAAC
Policies in Fig. 2 serves as Policies Repository that consists
of a collection of various policies for accessing available
resources or objects. Profiles serves as Profile Repository,
which essentially consists of subject as well as object profiles.
Both of these components will be referred to as Policies
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Repository and Profiles Repository later on in Section V.
Finally, Access List plays an important role in supporting
the capability-based authority delegation of access control by
controlling the capability propagation as well as revocation
through maintenance of a propagation tree as proposed in [1].
B. Proposed capability structure
Our proposed capability structure is an extension to
the Identity-based capability model [1], e.g. Identity based
Capability (ICAP), which extends the classical capability
structure [7]. In order to support the context awareness in
ICAP, an additional field called Contexts (C), which contains
context information related to the capability, is added in the
extCAP for subject i (Si). By including this field, the external
capability structure in CCAAC is defined as:
extCAPi = {O,AR, C, Rndi} (1)
where
Rndi = f(Si,O,AR, Rnd0) (2)
Rnd0 = f(O,AR) (3)
• Si: Representing identifier of Subject i that requests an
access.
• O: Name of object or resource to be accessed.
• AR: Type of access right, e.g. read, write, execute.
• C: Context information.
• Rnd: Random number generated from a one-way hash
function to prevent forgery.
The internal capability (inCAP ) that creates a pair with the
extCAP which is stored in the object itself or an entity that
has higher ”authority” over the object (e.g. in hierarchical type
of network). It is defined as follows:
inCAP = {O, Rnd0} (4)
where Rnd0 is defined exactly as in Equation 3.
C. Basic definitions
The important definitions used in CCAAC are presented
first by assuming a PN to be the targeted platform as the
important components of a Virtual Identity (VID) (the profile
and the context). However, VID can be defined in different
ways depending on the target platform.
1) Definition 1 (VID): Conceptually speaking, an entity,
e.g. subject or object, may have more than one identity, namely
one main identity and numbers as other alias identities. Each
identity that is associated with an entity is referred as VID,
thus an entity may have multiple VIDs. On the other end,
a VID can be linked to a set of policies where the same
policy can apply to different VIDs. Therefore, the relationship
between VIDs and disclosure policies is a many-to-many,
which can be implemented using a pointer or hash map.
Additionally, a VID consists of an identifier and is attached
with a particular context as well as profile information of the
corresponding entity and it can be assumed that the profile
information can be pre-defined as a set of default profiles
or customized to a specific VID. In any case, the profile is
assumed to have an one-to-one relationship with the VID and,
for the context, to have a many-to-many relationship with the
VID. A more detailed explanation of context will be presented
in the definition of contexts later on in this subsection.
Based on these relationships and assumptions, the VID is
defined as follows:
V ID ∈ {ID,P, C, Policies} (5)
The Profile P in VID may consist of objects’ attributes
and personal information. C refers to Contexts which can
be a security context, such as trust level or authentication
level, as well as other contexts, such as time and location.
The definition and detail information of Contexts C will be
given later in this section. The ID is a unique identifier that
can be acquired through cryptographic operations, while the
Policies is a set of Policy which will be explained in more
details in the next sub-section.
2) Definition 2 (Policy): As explained earlier, the policy
is essentially associated with certain VID(s) that describes
VID(s) preferences upon allowing other entities to access
them. Please note that the entity or subject requesting access is
described by its profile, e.g. subject’s attributes, in the policy.
A policy in the proposed CCAAC model holds an important
role in access control decision as well as any process involving
capability creation and delegation. It can simply be defined as
a set of rules with parameters related to the user as seen in
the following notation:
Policy ∈ {P, C,AR} (6)
It is important to note that since the Policy is linked with
a VID, which is then linked with an object, the notation
of the object or resource is not included in the Policy. On
another note, unlike the definition of VID, the P and C that
are included in the Policy’s rule are related to the subject who
are trying to gain access to the object.
3) Definition 3 (Contexts): The Contexts C, that is used to
define the VID and Policy is basically a set of contexts (CSet)
with different types (CType). The type of context can be a
concrete property such as time or location, but also security-
related context such as authentication and trust level. In order
to apply the context in the access control decision, each of
the context types has to be evaluated with a certain constraint
(CConst).
The overall context definition in CCAAC can be expressed
with the following notation:
CType ∈ {authLevel, trustLevel, time, location,
· · · } (7)
CSet = {CType(1), CType(2), · · · , CType(n)} (8)
CConst := 〈CType〉〈OP 〉〈V ALUE〉 (9)
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where OP is a logical operator, i.e. OP ∈ {>,≥, <,≤,=, 6=},
and V ALUE is a specific value of CType. Finally, we define
C as a set of context constraint CConst as follows:
C = {CConst(1), CConst(2), · · · , CConst(n)} (10)
4) Other definitions: : Other definitions that are used in the
formal specification of CCAAC are as follow:
P = {Profile1, P rofile2, · · · , P rofilen} (11)
Policies = {Policy1, Policy2, · · · , Policyn} (12)
AR ∈ {Read,Write,NULL} (13)
AR can either be {Read}, {Write}, {Read,Write}, or
{NULL}. If AR = {NULL}, the permission to access a
particular object is not allowed.
V. DELEGATION MODEL
Based on short description of the IoT-Federated network
in Section III and PN concept in [6], a high level delegation
model in Federated-IoT environment will be presented in this
section. This is followed by a delegation mechanism using
capability propagation based on the CCAAC model.
A. High level delegation model
To support a federation network in IoT, an entity called
IoT Federation Manager (IoT-FM) is introduced. IoT-FM is
responsible for managing the participation of an IoT network
domain in a federation by having some corresponding rules
and policies. In our proposed authority delegation model, an
IoT-FM has an additional functionality that is to authorize
the delegation request from a delegator and grant it to the
delegatee. Delegator is an entity that delegates some or all
of its authority to another entity, while delegatee is an entity
that receives an authority delegation from the delegator. Fig. 3
shows our proposed high level delegation model in federated-
IoT.
Network 
domain 1
Network 
domain 2
IoT-FM 1 IoT-FM 2
Delegator/
Subject
Resource/
Object
Delegatee
2
1
3
Fig. 3. High level delegation model on Federated-IoT
Please note that in CCAAC notation, we defined terms such
as Subject and Object. Essentially, any Subject can be either
Delegator or Delegatee. However, Delegator will be referred
to as Subject (S) for the sake of the protocol explanation in the
rest of this paper. In another note, the resource to be accessed
by Subject is referred as Object (O) as defined in CCAAC.
Furthermore, Fig. 3 also shows a high level delegation
from S to the delegatee (D). In this case we assume that
trust relationship has been established between two network
domains when the federated network is created [6] through
some mutual authentication mechanism between two domains.
Therefore, S would send a delegation request signed with a
shared secret key between S and IoT-FM 2 upon requesting
its authority delegation towards D (step 1 in Fig. 3). Upon
receiving the delegation request from S, IoT-FM 2 would
verify the signature with its pair key and then evaluate the
delegation request based on some available policies which
will be further explained in the next subsection. In case of
a positive delegation request evaluation result, a delegation
request response in a form of external capability (extCAPD)
with D’s identity would be sent to S, otherwise an error
message would be sent instead (step 2 in Fig. 3). Finally, the
S would send the extCAPD encrypted with a public key that
is known by D as a result of trust relationship when federated
network between two domains was established (step 3 in Fig.
3).
B. Delegation mechanism based on CCAAC
As described in previous subsection that IoT-FM would
evaluate the delegation request upon receiving it and would
further decide whether to grant the authority delegation to D
or not. The whole process of the delegation mechanism along
with the delegation request evaluation in IoT-FM is depicted
in Fig. 4.
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Fig. 4. Capability propagation protocol for authority delegation in our
proposed access control
It is important to mention that Fig. 4 is the micro-level view
of Fig. 3 where S and IoT-FM belong to Network Domain 2,
and D belongs to Network Domain 1. Detailed explanations
in the delegation mechanism depicted in Fig. 4 is presented
as follows:
1) Sending authority delegation request: Authority delega-
tion request is being sent by S to the Security Decision Point
(SDP) within IoT-FM. The request message is signed with a
shared key between S and IoT-FM so that IoT-FM is able to
make sure the message is indeed sent by S and the integrity
is maintained. Please note that the type of shared-key, i.e.
either symmetric or asymmetric, and the specific encryption
algorithm being used are not within the scope of this work.
2) Mapping the V IDD to Profile: The SDP checks the
message’s signature. If the signature is valid, the SDP then
asks VID-Profiles mapping box to map the profiles of D given
V IDD. It will return the profile of D.
3) Check the relevant policies: The returned Profiles P ,
together with the C and V IDO, are then sent to the Policies
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Repository, to check the disclosure policies of the correspond-
ing Object (based on its VID).
4) Return the relevant policies: The Policies Repository
gets all the relevant policies from the given P and C of the
object or resource of interest represented by its V IDO, and
then gives them to the SDP.
5) Delegation decision: The SDP combines the received
policies with a policy-combining algorithm and comes up with
a decision whether to approve the authority delegation by
creating a new capability (CAP) for D or not. In the case
of a positive decision, the SDP creates a delegation statement
in the form of extCAP for the D and then sends it to S. More
specifically, the only difference between the newly created
extCAP and the one that is owned by the S, lies in the D’s
identifier D within the Rndi component, that is used instead
of the S. In the case of a negative decision, a rejection message
will be sent to S instead.
6) Update propagation tree: In parallel to sending the
delegation decision, the SDP sends a report regarding the CAP
creation of an object for Subject i, Si, to the Access Control
Servers (ACS) which will be followed by the creation of a
new propagation tree.
7) Sending authority delegation statement: Finally, S sends
the authority delegation statement in the form of extCAP
particularly for D. Moreover, in order to maintain the con-
fidentiality and integrity of the extCAP , it can be signed with
a shared secret key between S and D, based on an assumption
that both domains have established a trust relationship by
authenticating each other through a certain key pair.
Steps 2 trough 5 of the delegation mechanism as described
in the above explanation can be expressed in the pseudo-code
as presented in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Capability delegation decision
procedure DELEGATECAP(V IDD, V IDO)
P ← getProfiles(V IDD)
C ← getContexts(V IDD)
Policies← checkPolicies(P, C, V IDO)
decision← combinePolicies(Policies)
if decision 6= NULL then
if IntCAP = 0 then
inCAP ← createIntCAP (V IDO)
end if
extCAP ← createExtCAP (V IDD,AR, V IDO)
end if
end procedure
First of all, it is assumed that S as the delegator knows
the identity of the O and D. This is possible when the
delegator S, subscribes to a service, in which a device in
the service provider’s domain needs to be given an authority
delegation, i.e. as delegatee D, in order to access a device
or resource within the delegator’s network domain, i.e. O.
With this assumption, S needs to submit a delegation request
by stating the identities of D and O in the form of V IDD
and V IDO, respectively. Once submitted, delegatee’s Profile
(P) and Context (C) can be obtained from V IDD as they are
attached to it (see Equation 5). Afterwards, all relevant policies
related to V IDO that contain delegatee’s P and C are gathered
from the Policies Repository to be further evaluated by a
certain Policies Combining Algorithm to obtain a delegation
decision.
VI. CONCLUSION
Authority delegation is an important mechanism to support
dynamic and flexible access control. It is mainly challenging
to design such a delegation in access control for Federated
IoT due to its dynamic and distributed nature. In this paper,
we presented our definition of the Federated IoT, which
thus far has not been particularly discussed in the literature.
Furthermore, the definition of Federated IoT is used as a
baseline in designing our proposed access control model
along with authority delegation mechanism that incorporates
identity-based capability and dynamic context information.
The protocol description and security consideration involving
the usage of cryptographic keys are further presented in the
paper to give some guidelines in the practical implementation.
A possible future work is to incorporate a secure authority
delegation method based on CCAAC of the proposed model
and then evaluate its security effectiveness. Furthermore, other
directions of this work also involves the extension of an
authority delegation design along with verification and im-
plementation, considering that no prior knowledge of the
trust relationship between two network domains in Federated
IoT. Unlike the approach used in this paper, an additional
entity that is trusted by both domains, for instance Identity
Provider (IdP), needs to be involved in the design. Another
interesting direction would be incorporating our proposed
access control as well as delegation model with an auto-
delegation mechanism as presented in [8].
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